Consequentialism has a hard time with praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, since it implies that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness ought to be assigned on the basis of which assignment has the best consequences. It might be nice to rescue a non-instrumental understanding of praise and blame from the consequentialist framework, but there could be different ways of doing it and we ought to be precise about how we go about doing such a thing.
I think you ought to start out with solid premises of value and how one ought to act, and then come to a theory of praiseworthiness/blameworthiness based on that if you still see a need for it. So worry about what is impermissible, what is permissible, what is obligatory, and what is supererogatory. Or, if you like, adopt a scalar theory like some utilitarians do, where the goodness of an action is on a gradient from good to bad.
Then, though I am not obligated to relinquish my interests (because mine hold the same value as all others, and all people are of equal value), I am obligated, at the very minimum, to divide my surplus resources equally, keeping half for myself and distributing half to others who are in most need of it.
I don’t see a good justification here. Surely, if everyone’s interests are equal, then this naively implies that we ought to divide surplus resources equally among all, keeping 1⁄7,000,000,000 for ourselves? Why half for oneself and half for everybody else?
You’re saying that we need to respect everyone’s interests equally. But there’s different ways of understanding that. What about spending more than 1⁄7,000,000,000 of one’s income on oneself, so that one can be more productive? (I expect everyone to agree with this logic.) And how do you take differences in marginal utility into account? I may value the interests of a poor man equally to my own, but under utilitarian logic this would imply that I ought to give him more than half of what I own, since he has a greater use for it than I do. And under egalitarian logic, a principle of equality implies that we ought to only care about the interests of the worst-off.
And why should we divide our surplus resources in such a way? Why not all our resources, if we’re giving equal interest? Only putting our surplus resources up for consideration, when other people lack basic resources, seems to be an unequal way of doing things.
It is only beyond this point that giving would be thought of as altruistic
Nitpicking, but donating to support others simply is altruism. The way you’re using the term here is unusual.
kbog and Jamie_Cassidy—Thanks so much for your kind remarks, questions, criticisms and observations. I appreciate it. I’ll try to address both sets of comments in this post.
Q -- “Surely, if everyone’s interests are equal, then this naively implies that we ought to divide surplus resources equally among all, keeping 1⁄7,000,000,000 for ourselves? Why half for oneself and half for everybody else?”
A—Though this idea may seem naive, I’m not sure that it is. Perhaps we could look at it from another perspective, from the other end of the stick, if you will.
Though I am not obligated to relinquish my interests (because mine hold the same value as all others, and all people are of equal value), I am obligated to bound those interests by my moral obligations. And I am obligated to divide my surplus resources equally (thus giving equal regard to myself and others), keeping half for myself and giving half to others. Though it is not immediately obvious, this obligation is always the same, irrespective of the number of people in the system, simply because all people in the system live under the same obligation to themselves and to others, whether it’s two people or 7 billion. It’s not me and 7 billion others, it’s 7 billion of us together, each one as both oneself and another.
The fact that, in practice, this would be radical, complicated, and difficult, does not negate the argument. It just means it would be radical, complicated and difficult. The fact that this interpretation would not be accepted by a great number of people doesn’t deflect its import.
Q—Nitpicking, but donating to support others simply is altruism. The way you’re using the term here is unusual.
Regarding my definition of term ‘altruism’—that it is the amount we give above and beyond our moral obligation—yes, this is an unusual interpretation of the term. But it is more accurate (and more humbling). Think about it. I find someone’s jacket on the side of the road, I carry it with me for a while, I like it, it looks good on me. When I see the owner, I say, “Too bad, I found it: It’s mine.” Clearly, we haven’t met our moral obligation. If we give him back his jacket, we have merely met our moral obligation. But we haven’t been altruistic, we haven’t given him anything that was not already his. But, if we gave him back his jacket and also a pair of gloves, we would then be altruistic, that is, we would have gone beyond our moral obligation.
The fact that this is an unusual definition of the term is not a good reason to argue that it is therefore a wrong use of the term, particularly if it uncovers a deep ethical misperception or articulates a more nuanced understanding, an understanding that may lead us to a deeper level of humility.
Q—And why should we divide our surplus resources in such a way? Why not all our resources, if we’re giving equal interest? Only putting our surplus resources up for consideration, when other people lack basic resources, seems to be an unequal way of doing things.
A—Simply because our basic needs are as important as the basic needs of other’s. We must consider our basic needs first, and then distribute half of what is left. In other words, only those resources that exceed our basic needs should be given consideration.
Q—While I generally find truth in the idea that those with more disposable income have a greater relative obligation to help others, I see nothing inherently wrong with living well.
I agree, but from this perspective ‘living well’ is necessarily bounded by our moral obligations. There is plenty of room for living well, though little room for living really, really well.
And I am obligated to divide my surplus resources equally (thus giving equal regard to myself and others), keeping half for myself and giving half to others. Though it is not immediately obvious, this obligation is always the same, irrespective of the number of people in the system, simply because all people in the system live under the same obligation to themselves and to others, whether it’s two people or 7 billion. It’s not me and 7 billion others, it’s 7 billion of us together, each one as both oneself and another.
Okay, but again, why? I just don’t see why the fact that we should treat everyone’s interests equally implies that we can keep half of our resources.
Simply because our basic needs are as important as the basic needs of other’s.
If our needs are equally important to everyone else’s, then surely others have an equal moral claim on the resources that we use for our basic needs, right? To say that our basic needs aren’t subject to claims from others implies that our basic needs are more important than others’ basic needs.
I admit that I do not know how to say it more clearly than I have, and that what I have said is not enough to be convincing. The only thing I can say again is that the 50⁄50 split is a way of showing equal regard for myself and others in a system in which everyone is under the same obligation and is acting upon that obligation. I will probably rest my argument until I can articulate it more adequately.
You also said: If our needs are equally important to everyone else’s, then surely others have an equal moral claim on the resources that we use for our basic needs, right?
This part I don’t understand. How can anyone make a moral claim on the basic needs of another? I don’t see how this could be. I am only saying that every person has a right to meet their personal needs for food, shelter, etc. -- including myself, so my obligation to give begins after these modest needs are met, we give from what remains. Help me here.
How can anyone make a moral claim on the basic needs of another?
I said that people have an equal claim on resources. This implies that resources ought to be distributed on the basis of need. Sure, you can say that someone has a right to meet their own needs for food and shelter. But I don’t see how my own interests in unnecessary luxury spending should weigh equally against other people’s interests in getting their basic needs fulfilled. You can’t say that you’re treating people’s interests equally by splitting things half and half, when in reality you’ve already taken an advantage. If we’re at a party and I say that I’m going to eat as much of the cake as I need to no longer be hungry, and then I split it with the hungry people after I took what I needed while continuing to eat more, I’m not sharing it fairly. I should either take what I need and then give up the rest, or I should split it equally in the first place.
The idea of trying to come up with a minimum level of giving to fulfill your moral obligation is a nice one, and one Singer tries to address in his ’Life You Can Save Pledge by varying the % of donation with income. However, you are going to need a lot more logical rigour when attempting to construct a framework.There is no direct logical link between point 6. and the previous points, which you seem to be framing as the assumptions required to reach your conclusion.
I would also ask you to question your assumptions. Consider for example assumption 1; some people find it extremely onerous to live a frugal lifestyle, while others find it onerous to work long hours or in stressful jobs. Imagine you have a job where you can always choose to work over-time. I would argue that if you choose to work 60 hours a week, spend more than you need to on yourself, (multiple vehicles etc.) and donate $2k a month to charity then that is certainly no worse than choosing to work 40 hours a week and donating $1.5k a month.
While I generally find truth in the idea that those with more disposable income have a greater relative obligation to help others, I see nothing inherently wrong with living well.
Consequentialism has a hard time with praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, since it implies that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness ought to be assigned on the basis of which assignment has the best consequences. It might be nice to rescue a non-instrumental understanding of praise and blame from the consequentialist framework, but there could be different ways of doing it and we ought to be precise about how we go about doing such a thing.
I think you ought to start out with solid premises of value and how one ought to act, and then come to a theory of praiseworthiness/blameworthiness based on that if you still see a need for it. So worry about what is impermissible, what is permissible, what is obligatory, and what is supererogatory. Or, if you like, adopt a scalar theory like some utilitarians do, where the goodness of an action is on a gradient from good to bad.
I don’t see a good justification here. Surely, if everyone’s interests are equal, then this naively implies that we ought to divide surplus resources equally among all, keeping 1⁄7,000,000,000 for ourselves? Why half for oneself and half for everybody else?
You’re saying that we need to respect everyone’s interests equally. But there’s different ways of understanding that. What about spending more than 1⁄7,000,000,000 of one’s income on oneself, so that one can be more productive? (I expect everyone to agree with this logic.) And how do you take differences in marginal utility into account? I may value the interests of a poor man equally to my own, but under utilitarian logic this would imply that I ought to give him more than half of what I own, since he has a greater use for it than I do. And under egalitarian logic, a principle of equality implies that we ought to only care about the interests of the worst-off.
And why should we divide our surplus resources in such a way? Why not all our resources, if we’re giving equal interest? Only putting our surplus resources up for consideration, when other people lack basic resources, seems to be an unequal way of doing things.
Nitpicking, but donating to support others simply is altruism. The way you’re using the term here is unusual.
kbog and Jamie_Cassidy—Thanks so much for your kind remarks, questions, criticisms and observations. I appreciate it. I’ll try to address both sets of comments in this post.
Q -- “Surely, if everyone’s interests are equal, then this naively implies that we ought to divide surplus resources equally among all, keeping 1⁄7,000,000,000 for ourselves? Why half for oneself and half for everybody else?”
A—Though this idea may seem naive, I’m not sure that it is. Perhaps we could look at it from another perspective, from the other end of the stick, if you will.
Though I am not obligated to relinquish my interests (because mine hold the same value as all others, and all people are of equal value), I am obligated to bound those interests by my moral obligations. And I am obligated to divide my surplus resources equally (thus giving equal regard to myself and others), keeping half for myself and giving half to others. Though it is not immediately obvious, this obligation is always the same, irrespective of the number of people in the system, simply because all people in the system live under the same obligation to themselves and to others, whether it’s two people or 7 billion. It’s not me and 7 billion others, it’s 7 billion of us together, each one as both oneself and another.
The fact that, in practice, this would be radical, complicated, and difficult, does not negate the argument. It just means it would be radical, complicated and difficult. The fact that this interpretation would not be accepted by a great number of people doesn’t deflect its import.
Q—Nitpicking, but donating to support others simply is altruism. The way you’re using the term here is unusual.
Regarding my definition of term ‘altruism’—that it is the amount we give above and beyond our moral obligation—yes, this is an unusual interpretation of the term. But it is more accurate (and more humbling). Think about it. I find someone’s jacket on the side of the road, I carry it with me for a while, I like it, it looks good on me. When I see the owner, I say, “Too bad, I found it: It’s mine.” Clearly, we haven’t met our moral obligation. If we give him back his jacket, we have merely met our moral obligation. But we haven’t been altruistic, we haven’t given him anything that was not already his. But, if we gave him back his jacket and also a pair of gloves, we would then be altruistic, that is, we would have gone beyond our moral obligation.
The fact that this is an unusual definition of the term is not a good reason to argue that it is therefore a wrong use of the term, particularly if it uncovers a deep ethical misperception or articulates a more nuanced understanding, an understanding that may lead us to a deeper level of humility.
Q—And why should we divide our surplus resources in such a way? Why not all our resources, if we’re giving equal interest? Only putting our surplus resources up for consideration, when other people lack basic resources, seems to be an unequal way of doing things.
A—Simply because our basic needs are as important as the basic needs of other’s. We must consider our basic needs first, and then distribute half of what is left. In other words, only those resources that exceed our basic needs should be given consideration.
Q—While I generally find truth in the idea that those with more disposable income have a greater relative obligation to help others, I see nothing inherently wrong with living well.
I agree, but from this perspective ‘living well’ is necessarily bounded by our moral obligations. There is plenty of room for living well, though little room for living really, really well.
Okay, but again, why? I just don’t see why the fact that we should treat everyone’s interests equally implies that we can keep half of our resources.
If our needs are equally important to everyone else’s, then surely others have an equal moral claim on the resources that we use for our basic needs, right? To say that our basic needs aren’t subject to claims from others implies that our basic needs are more important than others’ basic needs.
Thanks again.
I admit that I do not know how to say it more clearly than I have, and that what I have said is not enough to be convincing. The only thing I can say again is that the 50⁄50 split is a way of showing equal regard for myself and others in a system in which everyone is under the same obligation and is acting upon that obligation. I will probably rest my argument until I can articulate it more adequately.
You also said: If our needs are equally important to everyone else’s, then surely others have an equal moral claim on the resources that we use for our basic needs, right?
This part I don’t understand. How can anyone make a moral claim on the basic needs of another? I don’t see how this could be. I am only saying that every person has a right to meet their personal needs for food, shelter, etc. -- including myself, so my obligation to give begins after these modest needs are met, we give from what remains. Help me here.
I said that people have an equal claim on resources. This implies that resources ought to be distributed on the basis of need. Sure, you can say that someone has a right to meet their own needs for food and shelter. But I don’t see how my own interests in unnecessary luxury spending should weigh equally against other people’s interests in getting their basic needs fulfilled. You can’t say that you’re treating people’s interests equally by splitting things half and half, when in reality you’ve already taken an advantage. If we’re at a party and I say that I’m going to eat as much of the cake as I need to no longer be hungry, and then I split it with the hungry people after I took what I needed while continuing to eat more, I’m not sharing it fairly. I should either take what I need and then give up the rest, or I should split it equally in the first place.
The idea of trying to come up with a minimum level of giving to fulfill your moral obligation is a nice one, and one Singer tries to address in his ’Life You Can Save Pledge by varying the % of donation with income. However, you are going to need a lot more logical rigour when attempting to construct a framework.There is no direct logical link between point 6. and the previous points, which you seem to be framing as the assumptions required to reach your conclusion.
I would also ask you to question your assumptions. Consider for example assumption 1; some people find it extremely onerous to live a frugal lifestyle, while others find it onerous to work long hours or in stressful jobs. Imagine you have a job where you can always choose to work over-time. I would argue that if you choose to work 60 hours a week, spend more than you need to on yourself, (multiple vehicles etc.) and donate $2k a month to charity then that is certainly no worse than choosing to work 40 hours a week and donating $1.5k a month. While I generally find truth in the idea that those with more disposable income have a greater relative obligation to help others, I see nothing inherently wrong with living well.